




he motivation for this article is the well-known and controversial work
of Sargent and Wallace (1981), who show the potential importance of
the government’s budget constraint for the behavior of nominal vari-
ables. The government’s lifetime budget constraint can place restrictions on
the behavior of future money growth and thus inﬂuence current economic
magnitudes through expectational channels. Some of Sargent and Wallace’s
results are indeed striking, and indicate that tight monetary policy can lead to
the unpleasant outcome of both higher expected inﬂation and a higher price
level. Theoretically, they highlight important intertemporal considerations, but
one wonders if these considerations are quantitatively meaningful in reality.
In order to investigate the quantitative signiﬁcance of monetarist arith-
metic, I develop a dynamic stochastic model in which the government’s budget
constraint has nontrivial implications. In particular, I use the methodology of
Dotsey (1994) and Dotsey and Mao (1996). Here both money growth and taxes
are stochastic, but one or both must endogenously respond to government debt
if the government is to maintain budget balance. When the monetary authority
does not respond to debt, I term its policy independent monetary policy, and
when it does respond to debt, I call it dependent monetary policy. The primary
focus of the article is on the behavior of nominal variables and involves a
comparison of their behavior when the monetary authority is and is not inde-
pendent. The main result is that, for reasonable parameterizations, and when the
tax authority responds to the level of debt, the underlying nominal behavior of
the economy does not signiﬁcantly depend upon whether the monetary author-
ity reacts to government ﬁnancing considerations. In this sense the monetarist
arithmetic is not so unpleasant.
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The considerations addressed in this article are also similar to those dis-
cussed in Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), Leeper (1991), and Woodford (1995).
These authors are all concerned with the relationship between the behavior
of money and nominal variables in models that emphasize the importance of
the government’s budget constraint. The article proceeds as follows. Section 1
reviews the key elements of the above-cited papers that are most relevant to
the experiments carried out in this article. Section 2 describes the behavior of
taxes and money growth as well as the underlying economic model. Section 3
investigates parameterizations that produce the spectacular example presented
in Sargent and Wallace, in which current inﬂation increases under contrac-
tionary monetary policy. These parameterizations do not accurately characterize
the U.S. economy and the spectacular example does not occur under realistic
behavioral assumptions. Section 4 analyzes a model economy that is more con-
sistent with that of the United States. For this case, data are generated under
both independent and dependent monetary policy rules. Only minor differences
are found in the behavior of nominal variables. Section 5 concludes.
1. LITERATURE SURVEY
Sargent and Wallace (1981) present a model economy that satisﬁes the mone-
tarist assumptions that the monetary base is closely connected to the price level
and that the monetary authority can raise seignorage through money creation.
They show that under certain conditions the monetary authority’s ability to con-
trol inﬂation is limited. The major condition responsible for this result is the
exogeneity of the process for the government’s deﬁcit. Given this exogeneity,
tight money today leads to higher inﬂation in the future and may even lead to
higher inﬂation today.
Leeper (1991) extends the Sargent and Wallace analysis to a stochastic
environment. Leeper’s model is, however, somewhat different in that the mon-
etary authority uses an interest rate instrument and reacts, in some cases, to
the rate of inﬂation. The monetary authority does not react speciﬁcally to debt
as it does in the model presented below. Also, another distinction between
Leeper’s model and my model is that I use money as the policy instrument.1
This modeling is more directly related to Sargent and Wallace.
Like Leeper, I ﬁnd that when monetary policy is independent, ﬁscal distur-
bances in the form of lump sum taxes have no inﬂuence on either nominal or
real variables. Also, as in Leeper, when the monetary authority responds to debt,
ﬁscal disturbances do affect the economy. Both the price level and the nominal
1 One could always make the money supply rule more realistic by including elements of
interest rate smoothing. For a detailed discussion on interest rate instruments in a rational expec-
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interest rate are positively related to debt. Contrary to his analysis, however, I
ﬁnd that a monetary contraction does not generally cause the nominal interest
rate to rise. This difference is a result of the more general stochastic process
that governs monetary policy, a process that allows for varying degrees of
persistence in policy. A current decline in money growth need not be offset by
an immediate increase in next period’s money growth as occurs in one of the
examples emphasized in his paper.
The analysis here is also related to the work of Aiyagari and Gertler (1985)
and Woodford (1995). These authors indicate that when monetary policy is
inﬂuenced by the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, nominal vari-
ables are sensitive to debt. In contrast to the results in Aiyagari and Gertler,
the model considered here indicates that the nominal interest rate and inﬂa-
tion are not necessarily higher when monetary policy depends on the level
of government debt. The difference in results occurs because the stochastic
process for money growth implies that low money growth rates are more likely
when the debt is low. Thus, the possible values of the nominal interest under
a dependent monetary policy span the values that occur when monetary policy
is independent.
Much of the work in this area adopts the confusing terminology of Ricar-
dian and non-Ricardian monetary policy. I choose not to use this terminology
and instead use the terms independent and dependent monetary policy. As
Aiyagari and Gertler point out, Ricardian monetary policies do not necessarily
imply that the Ricardian equivalence theorem holds. Also, different authors ap-
pear to have somewhat different interpretations of what constitutes a Ricardian
monetary regime. Aiyagari and Gertler adopt Sargent’s (1982) deﬁnition, which
refers to whether or not government bonds are fully backed by taxes. That is, the
ﬁscal authority commits to a tax process with a present discounted value equal
to the present discounted value of government spending and the current value
of outstanding government debt. Woodford’s deﬁnition is somewhat different. It
refers to the transversality condition on debt and whether that condition holds
independently. Thus, in Woodford’s terminology, a model can be Ricardian
even though seignorage revenues respond to changes in government debt. His
deﬁnition, therefore, allows money to respond to debt in a Ricardian world.
In all the models considered below, the real value of the debt is bounded,
and hence its present discounted value approaches zero. Yet debt does have
real and nominal effects in some of the models. Therefore, I prefer to use the
terminology of independent and dependent monetary policy.
2. THE MODEL
In this section I depict the ﬁscal and monetary policy process as well as the
technology and behavioral assumptions that characterize the economic envi-
ronment relevant to this study.76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Processes
The monetary and ﬁscal policy processes analyzed here are stochastic and
satisfy the government’s budget constraint. Monetary policy is deﬁned over
changes in base growth rather than in terms of setting the nominal interest
rates. This depiction of policy is consistent with previous literature relating
deﬁcit ﬁnance and inﬂation.2 This modeling of monetary policy also allows
one to investigate the consequences of money growth’s dependence on debt
while incorporating the empirically relevant behavior of taxes responding to
debt (see Bohn [1991]). Interest rate smoothing could easily be incorporated
by allowing the monetary authority to respond to unexpected movements in
the nominal interest rate without affecting the existence or uniqueness of the
solutions (see Boyd and Dotsey [1996]).
Money, Mt, is introduced through open market operations and behaves
according to
Mt = Mt−1(1 + ηt), (1)
where ηt is the stochastic rate of money growth.
Taxes are proportional to output. Thus, tax revenues, Tt, are given by
Tt = τtYt, (2)
where Yt is current nominal output and τt is the current tax rate. The govern-
ment’s nominal debt, Bt+1, therefore, follows
PB
t Bt+1 = G + Bt − Tt − ηtMt−1, (3)
where G represents ﬁxed transfer payments, and PB
t is the price of a bond at
date t that pays one dollar at date t+1. The real value of debt relative to ouput,
Bt+1/Yt+1 = bt+1, can be written as
bt+1 = Rt[g + bt − τt − (ηt/(1 + ηt))(Mt/Yt)](Yt/Yt+1), (4)
where Rt is the gross one period nominal interest rate.
A sufﬁcient condition for the government to obey its lifetime budget
constraint is for the tax and money growth processes to behave so that the
debt-to-GNP ratio is bounded. For that to happen, either one or both processes
must depend on government debt. When money and tax rates respond to debt
they are modeled as two-state Markov processes with endogenous transition
probabilities. Thus the processes are time varying. In particular, let the transi-
tion probabilities for taxes be
1 if bt < 0
prob(τt+1 = τl|τt = τl) = (1 − φbt)1/ν if 0 ≤ bt ≤ 1/φ (5)
0 if bt > 1/φ
2 For example see Sargent and Wallace (1981), Liviatan (1984), McCallum (1984), Drazen
(1985), Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), and Woodford (1995).M. Dotsey: Some Not-So-Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 77
0 if bt < 0
prob(τt+1 = τh|τt = τh) = φb1/ν
t if 0 ≤ bt ≤ 1/φ,
1 if bt > 1/φ
and those for money growth be
1 if bt < 0
prob(ηt+1 = ηl|ηt = ηl) = (1 − φbt)1/ψ if 0 ≤ bt ≤ 1/φ (6)
0 if bt > 1/φ
1 if bt < 0
prob(ηt+1 = ηh|ηt = ηh) = φb
1/ψ
t if 0 ≤ bt ≤ 1/φ,
0 if bt > 1/φ
where the subscripts l and h refer to low and high, respectively.
As long as the debt-to-GNP ratio rises when both taxes and money growth
rates are low and falls when tax rates and money growth rates are high, the debt-
to-GNP ratio is bounded and will only rarely lie outside the interval [0,1/φ]. As
bt approaches 1/φ, both taxes and money growth will be high with probability
one. Similarly, as bt approaches 0, both taxes and money growth will be low.
The parameters ν and ψ control the persistence of the two processes. For any
given debt-to-GNP ratio, as ν and ψ increase, the probability of remaining in
the current state increases. The above speciﬁcations of policy imply that current
realizations of taxes and money growth have implications for the entire future
path of policy through their effect on debt.
It is important to note that both the unconditional mean and the persis-
tence of money growth do not depend on the debt-to-GNP ratio. If instead
the monetary authority had no control over the mean and over persistence of
money growth rates, it would be trivial to show that the nominal behavior of
the economy depended on ﬁscal policy. Instead I explore the more difﬁcult
question of whether conditional dependence of monetary policy on debt affects
nominal magnitudes.
Alternatively, cases in which one of the processes is invariant to debt
can be analyzed. I allow for the invariance of tax rates when investigating
parameterizations that yield the spectacular case of Sargent and Wallace. I also
compare the nominal behavior of an economy when the money growth process
does and does not depend on debt.78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Technology and Preferences
Since I am primarily concerned with the nominal behavior of the economy,
I treat real output as ﬁxed at a constant level, y. Agents derive utility from













t+1 + ptct ≤ (1 − τt)ptyt + Mt−1 + Bt + Gt,
where p is the price level and E is the expectations operator conditional on
time 0 information. This speciﬁcation of preferences allows one to look at a
range of interest elasticities of money demand and to freely parameterize the
ratio m/c.
The ﬁrst-order conditions determining the demand for money and the op-

































where rt is the net nominal interest rate and Et is the expectations operator
conditional on time t information. Agents are assumed to know all contem-
poraneously dated variables as well as the nominal value of end-of-period
government debt. Equation (7) implies that money demand is unit elastic
with respect to the scale variable consumption and has an interest elasticity
of −(1/(1 + ρ))(1/(1 + r)). Also, for a given steady-state interest elasticity
the parameter θ determines the velocity of money. For example, as ρ goes to
inﬁnity m = c and the model approaches a cash-in-advance speciﬁcation, while
as ρ goes to zero money demand becomes unit elastic. Equation (8) governs the
optimal consumption-saving decision. Note that real money balances inﬂuence
intertemporal consumption choices through their effect on the marginal utility
of consumption. Higher current real money balances increase the marginal
utility of consumption and, holding expected future consumption and money
balances constant, imply a higher real interest rate.M. Dotsey: Some Not-So-Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 79
Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions for this economy are
ct = y, (9)
Mt/pt = mt, (10)
and
Bd
t+1 = Bt+1, (11)
along with the ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and (8), the agent’s budget constraint,
and the government’s budget constraint (3). The three equations (9)–(11)
merely state that demand equals supply in the goods, money, and bond markets,
respectively. Substituting (7) into (8) and using (9) and (10), these four equa-
tions can be used to derive a functional equation for the nominal interest rate.
Combined with the law of motion for real government debt (equation [4]) and
the stochastic processes for taxes and money growth, the equilibrium functions
for the nominal interest rate r(b,τ,η) and next period’s real debt b0(b,τ,η,τ0,η0)
can be solved (where the symbol “ 0 ” refers to next period value of a variable).
Using the solution for r, one can readily derive the solutions for real balances,
prices, and expected inﬂation. Thus, equilibrium is a set of functions for r, b0,
p, c, and m that satisfy equations (4), and (7)–(11). Because there is no closed
form solution, I obtain the solution numerically by solving for the relevant
functions along a grid of real debt levels and at the values of taxes and money
growth.
3. THE SPECTACULAR CASE
In their spectacular example, Sargent and Wallace showed that it is possible
for lower current money growth to cause both higher expected inﬂation and a
higher price level. The higher expected inﬂation occurs because lower money
growth increases the government’s indebtedness, implying that money growth
must be, on average, higher in the future. The higher expected future money
growth leads to higher expected inﬂation. Also, the higher expected inﬂation
reduces the current demand for real balances. If the reduction in demand is
large enough, the price level must rise to clear the money market. As Drazen
(1985) points out, this latter result requires an interest elasticity of at least one
in absolute value. Using the model of the previous section, we are able to
produce a spectacular example. To do so requires some additional assumptions
that are extreme when compared to actual economic behavior in the United
States. Besides the unusual responsiveness of money demand to nominal inter-
est rates, the ratio m/c must be higher than one observes in the data, and rates of
money growth in the high money growth state must be somewhat higher than
commonly observed in the post-war United States. Both of these counterfactual
parameterizations must be made in order to bound the debt-to-GNP ratio. That
is, both the tax base and the tax rate on money balances in the high money80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
growth state must be sufﬁciently high to pay off the increased debt burden that
accrues in the low money growth state.
The policy functions for the spectacular example are depicted in Figure 1.
To produce this example, the interest elasticity of money demand was set at
−1, the steady-state ratio m/c was set at 0.25, and the low and high money
growth rates were selected to be −1.25 percent and 13.5 percent, respectively.
Also, money growth is quite persistent with ψ = 5. This parameterization
corresponds to an autocorrelation of roughly 0.65. The model is calibrated at
an annual frequency and β = 0.98. With these parameter values, the debt
to GNP ratio lies between −0.46 and 0.58. As shown in the top panel of
Figure 1, the nominal interest rate is higher when money growth is low, even
though the money growth process is characterized by substantial persistence.3
This persistence is depicted in the middle panel of Figure 1, which shows that
agents expect substantially higher future money growth when money growth
is currently high. One also observes, in the bottom panel, that the price level
is higher when money growth is low.
To highlight the necessity of the high interest elasticity, I also examine the
case in which the interest elasticity is −0.20. This value is representative of
money demand in the United States (see Dotsey [1988]). As shown in Figure 2,
both the nominal interest rate and the price level are higher when current money
growth is high. Thus, the spectacular case is reversed. Additional insight into
the important role that the interest elasticity plays in producing the spectacular
result can be found in Table 1. This table shows the interest rates that would
occur under the high and low money growth rates for various elasticities of
money demand. These interest rates are obtained from the following thought
experiment. Suppose that the transition probability for money growth is 0.8
and independent of the debt. Also suppose that the tax authority adjusts taxes
to bound the level of debt. Then high current money growth always implies
higher future money growth. The interest rates that solve equation (8) can be
calculated for various values of the interest elasticity and a value of m/c = 0.25.
As depicted in the table, the difference between the nominal interest rate when
money growth is high as opposed to when it is low narrows substantially as
the interest elasticity increases in absolute value.
The narrowing of the spread between interest rates under high and low
money growth along with the implication that current low money growth leads
to higher average future money growth produce the spectacular example. Fur-
thermore, the high interest elasticity implies that money demand falls by more
than one-for-one with the money supply and the price level must rise to equi-
librate the money market.
3 The policy function for expected inﬂation is qualitatively identical to that of the nominal
interest rate. It is, therefore, omitted.M. Dotsey: Some Not-So-Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 81
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Table 1 Interest Elasticity Effects on Interest Rates
Interest Elasticity of






Note: In this example money growth takes on the values −0.0055 and 0.142, and the transition
probability of remaining in the same state is 0.8.
4. MONETARIST ARITHMETIC IN A
CALIBRATED MODEL
To explore the empirical signiﬁcance of monetarist arithmetic, I calibrate two
related models and compare the behavior of nominal variables and expected
lifetime utility. In both models, endowment is ﬁxed at one unit and government
transfers are equal to 0.189. The models are calibrated to produce a steady-state
interest elasticity of money demand of −0.20 and a ratio of money to consump-
tion of 0.10. At an annual frequency, both of these values are consistent with
U.S. data. The discount factor is set at 0.98, implying a steady-state real interest
rate of two percent. The money growth rates are 0.049 and 0.086, while the
tax rates are 0.17 and 0.229. The debt-to-GNP ratio lies within the interval
[−0.12, 0.62]. The two models are similar in that the tax authority responds to
the debt-to-GNP ratio as described in equation (5). The persistence parameter,
υ, is set at 3.5. The ﬁrst model considered depicts a dependent monetary policy
as described by equation (6) with a persistence parameter, ψ , equal to 5.0. The
second model allows monetary policy to be independent and the transition
probability of remaining in the same state of money growth is 0.85. These
parameterizations of tax rates and money growth produce realizations that are
consistent with U.S. experience over the period 1961 to 1995.
Policy Functions
The policy functions for the case in which monetary policy responds to debt
are depicted in Figure 3. One sees that expected money growth is positively
related to government debt. As government debt approaches one half of GNP,
the probability of both taxes and money growth being high approaches one.
Similarly, as debt approaches zero, the probability of both taxes and money
growth being low approaches one. Thus, the policy functions for the different
states converge as debt approaches its upper and lower bounds. The positive84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3
relationship between money growth and debt leads to a positive relationship
between debt and both the nominal interest rate and the price level. The per-
sistence of the money growth process also implies that higher rates of money
growth lead to higher nominal interest rates and a higher price level. Also, for
any given rate of money growth, higher taxes imply lower nominal interest
rates and lower prices. This result occurs because higher taxes reduce the debt
and, therefore, imply a lower average rate of future money growth. Conse-
quently, like Leeper (1991) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985), the model implies
that ﬁscal policy affects nominal variables through its inﬂuence on the path of
future money growth.
The real interest rate in this model is also related to the level of debt, mone-
tary policy, and ﬁscal policy. Higher rates of money growth are associated with
lower real balances and with a lower marginal utility of consumption. In the
case where money growth is high, the expected value of next period’s money
growth will be less than its current rate. Hence, next period’s real balances areM. Dotsey: Some Not-So-Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 85
expected to be higher and next period’s expected marginal utility will be greater
than current marginal utility. This relationship between current and expected
future marginal utility implies that the real interest rate will be lower when
money growth is currently high. Also, for any given rate of money growth,
higher taxes imply lower expected money growth in the future. This lower
expected future money growth is associated with higher expected future real
balances and a higher expected future marginal utility of consumption. Thus,
the real interest rate is lower when taxes are high. Similarly, because lower
debt implies lower future money growth, the real interest rate is low when debt
is low.
When monetary policy is independent, the policy functions look very dif-
ferent. As shown in Figure 4, debt and ﬁscal policy no longer have any effects
on economic variables. This invariance occurs because taxes and debt do not
inﬂuence the path of money growth. The policy functions, therefore, take on
only two values, one is associated with low money growth, and the other with
high money growth. As in the previous case, high money growth results in
higher interest rates and a higher price level. Comparison of Figures 3 and
4 reveals that the interest rate and the price level are not necessarily always
lower under independent monetary policy. This latter result contrasts with the
ﬁndings of Aiyagari and Gertler (1985) and occurs because conditional on the
debt being low, money growth is much more likely to be low with a dependent
monetary policy. Their results, therefore, are sensitive to the actual stochastic
speciﬁcation of policy.
Further Comparison of the Two Policies
To further contrast economic consequences of independent and dependent mon-
etary policies, I examine time series from model simulations. Each simulation
is 100 periods long and the results are averaged over 500 simulations. With
respect to dependent monetary policy, the simulated tax process has a mean
of 0.187 and a standard deviation of 0.027. These values compare with an
actual mean of average tax revenues over the period 1961 to 1995 of 0.189
and standard deviation of 0.0074. The simulated tax process is somewhat more
variable than the historical series on average tax rates but shows about the same
degree of variability as the average marginal tax rate series computed using the
methodology of Barro and Sahasakul (1986).4 The mean of money growth is
0.06 and its standard deviation is 0.017. These values are similar to the actual
values for the growth rate of the monetary base, which had a mean of 0.067
and a standard deviation of 0.020.
A further comparison between the generated processes for taxes and money
growth and their empirical counterparts can be obtained by examining the
4 The Barro and Sahasakul series was taken from DRI, and its standard deviation is 0.0260.86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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following linear regressions. For generated data under a dependent monetary
policy, the regressions are given by
τt = 0.070 + 0.561τt−1 + 0.073bt−1, (12)
(0.014) (0.082) (0.023)
ηt = 0.017 + 0.700ηt−1 + 0.007bt−1, (13)
(0.005) (0.109) (0.014)
while for an independent monetary policy the corresponding regressions are
τt = 0.064 + 0.600τt−1 + 0.067bt−1, (14)
(0.014) (0.083) (0.023)
ηt = 0.024 + 0.663ηt−1 − 0.010bt−1, (15)
(0.007) (0.080) (0.015)M. Dotsey: Some Not-So-Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 87
where standard errors are in parentheses. From these regressions alone, it would
be difﬁcult to distinguish between the two regimes. All the comparable coefﬁ-
cients differ insigniﬁcantly from each other and in neither regime does monetary
policy appear to depend on debt. The reason for the insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient
on debt in the money growth regression (13) is that taxes are doing the bulk
of the work in controlling debt. The money growth process is highly persistent
(see Figure 5), even at the bounds of the debt space, and taxes are more likely
to change states in order to reduce the debt when it is high or increase the debt
when it is low. Thus, a simple econometric exercise to test whether seignor-
age is inﬂuenced by debt would fail to uncover this feature in the dependent
monetary regime.
Based on actual data over the period 1961 to 1995, the corresponding
regressions are
τt = 0.070 + 0.62τt−1 + 0.005bt−1, (16)
(0.027) (0.14) (0.0097)
ηt = 0.028 + 0.68ηt−1 − 0.013bt−1. (17)
(0.015) (0.095) (0.021)
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With the exception of the insigniﬁcance of debt on average tax rates, the regres-
sions on actual and generated data are quite similar.5 The calibrated processes,
therefore, seem to be fairly representative of actual processes.
To compare the inﬂuences of monetary policy in the two model economies,
I examine impact effects and correlations. For the chosen parameterization the
steady-state value of the nominal interest rate is 0.0887, the real interest rate
is 0.020, and the price level is 10M. With low taxes, low money growth, and
a dependent monetary policy, the nominal interest rate falls to 0.0807 and the
price level declines to 9.810. If taxes were high, then the interest rate would
decline to 0.0770 and the price level would fall to 9.719. With an independent
monetary policy, low money growth results in a nominal interest rate of 0.0809
and a price level of 9.814. Here, unlike the ﬁnding in Aiyagari and Gertler
(1985), monetary policy in a dependent regime does affect the price level. Fur-
thermore, although ﬁscal policy also affects the price level, the effect is much
less than one-for-one. For example, under low money growth and high taxes,
inﬂation is 4.3 percent as opposed to 5.0 percent when taxes are low. These
contrary results occur for two reasons. One is the explicit stochastic process for
policy and the other is the lower interest elasticity of money demand. As the
interest elasticity approaches zero, so that m = c, prices must move one-for-one
with money regardless of the regime.
The preceding example shows that the impact effects of monetary policy
differ somewhat across regimes. It remains to ask whether the correlations
between policy and nominal variables are very different across regimes. The
correlations are depicted in Table 2. The top panel shows the correlation co-
efﬁcients that occur under a dependent monetary policy and the bottom panel
depicts the same correlations under an independent monetary policy. With re-
spect to the correlations between money growth, η, and other nominal variables
or between money growth and real balances, the correlations are somewhat
smaller under a dependent monetary policy, but by-and-large the correlations
are quite similar. The only quantitatively signiﬁcant differences occur with
respect to correlations involving the real interest rate. However, as shown by
the policy functions, the real interest rate shows very little variation. Given the
presence of measurement error, it would be difﬁcult in practice to identify the
monetary regime through the use of data on ex ante real interest rates. Thus,
the data generated by the two different models are very much the same.
5 Although taxes do not seem to respond to debt over the short sample period considered
here, ﬁscal policy does seem to respond to debt over longer time horizons (see Bohn [1991]) and
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Table 2 Correlation Coefﬁcients
Dependent Monetary Policy
m r π πe π π rr
η −0.848 0.854 0.862 0.864 −0.900
m −0.998 −0.999 −0.759 0.577




m r π πe π π rr
η −1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 −1.00
m −1.00 −1.00 −0.88 1.00
r 1.00 0.88 −1.00
πe 0.88 −1.00
π 0.88
Note: η is money growth, m is real balances, r is the net nominal interest rate, πe is expected
inﬂation, π is actual inﬂation, and rr is the ex ante real rate of interest.
5. CONCLUSION
This article analyzes the economic effects of a monetary policy that responds
to debt and compares those effects with ones that arise under an independent
monetary policy. A principal ﬁnding is that the nominal behavior of the two
calibrated economies is not very different under the two types of monetary
regimes. Indeed, linear regression analysis is unable to distinguish between the
two economies. It would be even more difﬁcult to distinguish econometrically
between independent and dependent monetary policy if dependent monetary
policy only reacted to debt at the boundaries of the debt-to-GNP ratio rather
than continuously as it does in the above example. Thus, the monetarist arith-
metic is not overly unpleasant.
My analysis also indicates that in explorations of the interrelationship be-
tween monetary and ﬁscal policy, the exact form of the stochastic processes
is important. Characteristics of the processes, such as persistence, are crucial
in gauging the economic effects of policy. Policy, both ﬁscal and monetary,
need not react immediately to changes in government debt, and the timing of
the reaction is important. The empirically based persistence of the process for
monetary policy is one feature of the model that leads to results that differ
from those of other authors.
In addition to demonstrating the importance of the stochastic processes, the
results in this article also indicate that behavioral parameters play an important90 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
role in determining the different effects that occur under the two types of mon-
etary policy. In particular, the interest elasticity of money demand is a crucial
parameter. The interest elasticity employed in this article is much lower than
that used in the papers of both Leeper (1991) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1985).
The lower interest elasticity is partly responsible for the inﬂuence exerted by
dependent monetary policy on the nominal interest rate in my model, which is
contrary to the results presented in Aiyagari and Gertler’s model. Furthermore,
a realistic parameterization of the interest elasticity implies that the spectacular
example of Sargent and Wallace is implausible. Thus, it appears that although
the intertemporal considerations highlighted by Sargent and Wallace are im-
portant theoretically, they appear to be less so in practice.
REFERENCES
Aiyagari, S. Rao, and Mark Gertler. “The Backing of Government Bonds and
Monetarism,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 16 (July 1985), pp.
19–44.
Barro, Robert J., and Chaipat Sahasakul. “Average Marginal Tax Rates from
Social Security and the Individual Income Tax,” Journal of Business, vol.
59 (October 1986), pp. 555–66.
Bohn, Henning. “Budget Balance through Revenue or Spending Adjustments?
Some Historial Evidence for the United States,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 27 (June 1991), pp. 333–59.
Boyd, John H., III, and Michael Dotsey. “Interest Rate Rules and Nominal
Determinacy,” Manuscript. University of Rochester and Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, June 1996.
Dotsey, Michael. “Some Unpleasant Supply Side Arithmetic,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 33 (June 1994), pp. 507–24.
. “The Demand for Currency in the United States,” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 20 (February 1988), pp. 22–40.
, and Ching Sheng Mao. “The Effects of Fiscal Policy in a
Neoclassical Growth Model,” Working Paper 94–3. Richmond: Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, February 1996.
Drazen, Allan. “Tight Money and Inﬂation: Further Results,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol. 15 (January 1985), pp. 113–20.
King, Robert G., and Charles I. Plosser. “Money, Deﬁcits, and Inﬂation,”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 22 (Spring
1985), pp. 147–96.M. Dotsey: Some Not-So-Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic 91
Leeper, Eric M. “Equilibria Under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary and Fiscal
Policies,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 27 (February 1991), pp.
129–47.
Liviatan, Nissan. “Tight Money and Inﬂation,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
vol. 13 (January 1984), pp. 5–15.
McCallum, Bennett T. “Are Bond-ﬁnanced Deﬁcits Inﬂationary? A Ricardian
Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 92 (February 1984), pp.
123–35.
Sargent, Thomas J. “The Ends of Four Big Inﬂations,” in Robert E. Hall, ed.,
Inﬂation: Causes and Effects. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
, and Neil Wallace. “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 5 (Fall
1981), pp. 1–17.
Woodford, Michael. “Price-Level Determinacy without Control of a Monetary
Aggregate,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol.
43 (December 1995), pp. 1–46.